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Abstract 
The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) for the Satorn/Rajpruek route in Bangkok is characterized by four inbound lanes and 
four outbound lanes separated by a traffic island. The lanes adjacent to the traffic island are designated as the BRT 
lane where no vehicles, except the BRT buses, are allowed access. The BMA anticipated that the project will reduce 
the number of vehicles along the Satorn/Rajpruek route which is the major reason used to justify the project. Granted 
that the BRT project can reduce the number of vehicles along the route it also causes traffic misallocations by causing 
too few vehicles in the BRT lane and too many vehicles in the remaining lanes which result in welfare losses. It is 
proposed that all vehicles are allowed access to the BRT lane if their drivers are willing to pay a ‘second best' 
congestion charge. The drivers that are not willing to pay the congestion charge still have free access to the remaining 
lanes. It is shown that the second best congestion charge can reduce welfare losses from the traffic misallocations 
when compared to the original BRT project. The second best congestion charge offers an option for vehicle users to 
be better off by accessing the BRT lane. If they are not willing to pay the congestion charge to access the BRT lane 
they still have free access to the remaining lanes and, hence, are not worse off than before.
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     1. Introduction 
  Traffic congestions are phenomenon that may be observed every day in a large city like 
Bangkok. Traffic congestions occur simply because the road or highway capacities are not 
sufficient to satisfy the demand for their usages. The most recent measure to alleviate the traffic 
congestions in Bangkok is the Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) project that was approved by the cabinet 
on January 3, 2007 (BMA Brochure, 2010). The main reason given for the approval of the BRT 
project is the anticipated reduction in traffic congestions (BMA Leaflet, 2010). The BRT project 
is supervised by the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) and is implemented initially for the 
Satorn/Rajpruek route that covers the distance of 15 kilometers with 12 stations. The BMA plans 
to expand the BRT concept to 14 other routes in Bangkok covering the distance of 250 
kilometers.  
  The Satorn/Rajpruek route is characterized generally by four inbound lanes and four 
outbound lanes separated by a traffic island with twelve stations along the route. The BMA 
designates the lanes adjacent to the traffic island as the BRT lane. There are three main 
designated areas in the BRT lane (see Figure 1). The first designated area allows entrance only 
for BRT buses. The second designated area allows entrance for vehicles with at least three 
occupants and the third designated area allows entrance for all vehicles. 
 
Figure 1  Satorn/Rajpruek BRT Route 
 
  
  The Satorn/Rajpruek route was opened on May 15, 2010 on a trial basis where 
commuters can use the BRT service free of charge for three months (BMA Leaflet, 2010). After 
the trial period, the fare between 12 and 20 baht depending on the distance will be collected. 
While the BRT is a new transportation mode for Thailand, it is in operations in many cities 
throughout the world. The Transportation Research Board (2009) has published the BRT case 
studies for 26 countries in terms of passengers carried, speed, and land development changes.  
  A brief example of the BRT performance evaluation for Vancouver is that 20 percent of 
the BRT riders previously used automobiles and 5 percent of whom were taking new trips. For 
the case of Bangkok, the BMA anticipates that about 6000 commuters by private vehicles along 
the Satorn/Rajpruek BRT route will switch to the BRT mode of travel which is equivalent to a 
reduction of about 5000 vehicles  along this route (BMA Leaflet 2010).    Granted that the BRT project can reduce the total number of vehicles on the 
Satorn/Rajpruek route, it also causes traffic reallocations among the four lanes along the route as 
some vehicles in the BRT lane are now forced to divert to the remaining three lanes. The traffic 
diversion implies that there will be fewer vehicles in the BRT lane and more vehicles in the 
remaining lanes. The relevant question is how to evaluate the impact of traffic reallocations from 
the BRT project on traffic congestions.  
  It is the purpose of this short article to propose an analytical framework to evaluate the 
impact of the traffic reallocations caused by the BRT project and to suggest some modifications 
to improve social welfare. The next section presents the analytical framework for the evaluation 
of the BRT project; section 3 proposed some modifications to the BRT project; summary and 
conclusions are then presented in section 4. 
  
2. Analytical Framework 
  The effects of the BRT project on traffic congestions along the Satorn/Rajpruek route 
may be illustrated by the traffic density and flow diagrams in Figure 2. The relationship between 
the traffic flow, traffic density, and vehicle speed are presented in linear form for simplicity of 
illustration. It is reasonable to assume that the traffic flows in the four lanes are perfect 
substitutes since drivers can freely switch lanes while driving along this route prior to the BRT 
project. Let the traffic density and traffic flow in each of the four lanes before the BRT project is 
implemented equals D1 vehicle per kilometer and F1 vehicle per hour with an average speed of v1 
kilometer/hour.  
  When the BRT lane is implemented, the traffic density and the traffic flow in the BRT 
lane is expected to decrease to a free flow level, say, DBRT and FBRT since fewer vehicles can 
enter this lane. The vehicle speed in the BRT lane is expected to increase to the free flow level of 
VBRT kilometer/hour. The traffic density and traffic flow in the three remaining lanes are 
expected to increase to, say D2 and F2, as some of the flows in the BRT lane are diverted to these 
lanes and the average speed in these lanes falls to v2 kilometer/hour.  
  The effect of the BRT project on the total traffic flow and its reallocations among the four 
lanes can be evaluated in terms of its impact on social welfare. Economists as early as Knight 
(1924) have recognized traffic congestions as one form of externality from the use of vehicles.
1 
The effect of the BRT project on social welfare is presented analytically in Figure 3. D is the 
total traffic demand for the four lanes, APC is the average generalized costs of a vehicle user that 
can be disaggregated into fuel, oil, tires, maintenance, depreciation, and time (Walters, 1961), 
and MSC is the marginal social cost which is the cost imposed on other vehicle users by a 
marginal increase in traffic flow. The left and middle panels show the APC and MSC for the 
BRT lane and the remaining lanes respectively. The right panel presents the APC and MSC for 
the entire route. 
  A utility maximizing vehicle user will only consider his private generalized costs and not 
the social costs imposed on other drivers. Before the BRT project is implemented, an equilibrium 
traffic flow where the average generalized costs equal the marginal benefits is T1 vehicles/hour. 
The total traffic flow allocations are B1 in the BRT lane and A1 in the remaining lanes. The 
average and marginal generalized costs for all lanes are equal at equilibrium other wise drivers 
will switch to lanes with lower costs. 
 
                                                            
1There are other exernalities associated with the uses of vehicles.  See Parry et al (2009) for an excellent summary of  
the other types of vehicle related externalities. Figure 2 Traffic Flow Diagram for the Satorn/Rajpruek Route 
 
 
   
  Even though the average and marginal generalized costs in each lane are equal the 
equilibrium traffic flow is not efficient from a social welfare point of view because the marginal 
costs from the total traffic flow exceed their marginal benefits. An efficient equilibrium requires 
an internalization of the marginal congestion costs of RW for all lanes which will reduce the total 
traffic flow to T3 in the right panel of Figure 3. The efficient T3 total traffic flow consists of B3 in 
the BRT lane and A3 in the remaining lanes. The welfare losses from allowing free access to all 
lanes along this route are then equal to the area RSW in the right panel. 
  When the BRT lane is implemented, the total traffic flow along the route is expected to 
fall to, say, T2. If there are no restrictions to enter the BRT lane the efficient allocations of the T2 
total traffic flow are achieved when the marginal costs are equal for all lanes. The efficient 
allocations of the total T2 traffic flow are then B4 in the BRT lane and A4 in the remaining lanes. 
However, the restricted entrance into the BRT lane leads to a traffic flow of less than B4 in this 
lane and more traffic flow than A4 in the remaining lanes. Let the vehicle speed in the BRT lane 
increases to the free flow level so the traffic flow in this lane falls to B2 and the traffic flow in the 
remaining lanes increases to A2 in the remaining lanes. 
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  As the total traffic flow T2 is now closer to the efficient flow T3 it may appear that the 
BRT project improves social welfare by the area SUE in the right panel. Granted that the BRT 
project is able to reduce the total traffic flow, but it also creates misallocations of traffic flow 
between the BRT lane and the remaining lanes as the marginal costs in the BRT lane are now 
lower than the marginal costs in the remaining lanes. The misallocations of traffic flow imply 
that there are too few vehicles in the BRT lane and too many vehicles in the remaining lanes. 
The misallocations of traffic flow thus result in welfare losses of HGI in the BRT lane and JRK 
in the remaining lanes.  
  
3. Some Recommendations 
  The limitation of the BRT project to alleviate traffic congestions along the 
Satorn/Rajpruek route is the reduction of total traffic flow by traffic control rather than by the 
price mechanism through the collection of congestion charge. The traffic control results in 
welfare losses from the misallocations of traffic flow. Even though economists accept the 
collection of congestion charge as one of the solution to the traffic congestion problems, the 
initial obstacle to its implementation is the fear of socio-political repercussions and resistance 
from the general public. A political willingness and commitment is required to implement the 
congestion charge. A good example of the political willingness to implement the congestion 
charge in spite of the initial resistance to its proposal is the introduction of the congestion charge 
for London by Mayor Livingstone in 2003 which, after strong initial resistance, steadily gains 
public support when the public recognized its benefit (Litman, 2006).  
  The issue of implementing the congest charge for Bangkok has been mulled but has not 
received serious consideration from the BMA. A former BMA governor had told Mayor 
Livingstone of London, a pioneer of congestion charge for London, that he was interested in the 
success story of the London congestion charge but had little clue how the measure could begin in 
Bangkok without a good public transport system (Asia Finest Discussion Forum, 2007).  
   A survey was conducted in Bangkok to gauge the public acceptance of the congestion 
charge (Kunchornrat et al., 2008). When the respondents were asked if they would support the congestion fee policy on all freeways in the region, only 22 percent of the respondents support 
the policy. But when the respondents were asked if they would support the congestion fee policy 
if it is collectable only on the left-most lane of all free ways leaving the remaining lanes for free 
travel, 45 percent of the respondents now support the policy. 
    
































    Taking the socio-political barriers to the implementation of congestion charge into 
consideration, it is proposed that the congestion charge is initially implemented on a very small 
scale. Within this perspective, the BRT project provides an opportunity to try out the congestion 
charge concept for Bangkok. The BMA can modify the BRT project by allowing all vehicle 
owners an option to enter the BRT lane if they pay an entrance fee or the congestion charge. 
When compared to the original BRT project where no vehicles other than the BRT buses are 
allowed entrance to the BRT lane, the vehicle owners are offered the chance to be better off by 
paying for the right to enter this lane. In the extreme case where no vehicle owners are willing to 
pay the congestion charge, they still have free access to the remaining lanes and, hence, are not 
worse off than before. 
  The congestion charge collected only for the BRT lane is the second best charge that is 
lower than the first best charge RW in Figure 2 since it does not internalize all of the congestion 
externality along this route. Verhoef et al. (1996) provide a mathematical derivation of the 
optimal second best congestion charge for an equivalent case where a congestion charge is 
collected for one route while allowing free access to the other route that is its perfect substitute. 
The second best congest charge for the BRT lane would be such that the average costs of vehicle 
users in the BRT lane plus the second best congestion charge equals the average costs of vehicle 
users in the remaining free lanes. This equalization ensures equilibrium between the lanes, other 
wise vehicles in the lane with higher average costs will shift to the lane with lower average costs.  
  The effect of the second best congestion charge on social welfare is illustrated in Figure 4 
which is redrawn from Figure 3. A second best congestion charge of C1C4 collected from vehicle 
users that enter the BRT lane will increase the traffic flow from B2 to Bs which is less than the 
traffic flow of B3 when the first best congestion charge of RW is collected for all lanes. This is because some vehicles users will divert to the free lanes under the second best congestion charge 
scheme. 
  An option for all vehicle users to enter the BRT lane will decrease the traffic flow in the 
remaining lanes from A2 under the original project to As where the average costs of vehicle users 
in these lanes equal the marginal benefits. It is seen that the welfare losses are reduced by GMLH 
in the BRT lane and by JQN in the remaining lanes. The welfare losses of MIL in the BRT lane 
and JNQ in the other lanes from traffic misallocation still remain and can be removed only by the 
first best congestion charge.  
 
4. Summary and Conclusions 
  The BRT project has been implemented in Bangkok for the Satorn/Rajpruek route 
covering the distance of 15 kilometers. Under the BRT project, vehicles are generally prohibited 
to enter the BRT lane that is reserved for the BRT buses. The BMA anticipated that the project 
can reduce the number of traffic along this route. However, the impact of the project on traffic 
allocations along the route has not received attention of the authority. It is shown that the BRT 
project causes traffic misallocations along the route which result in welfare losses. 
  The Satorn/Rajpruek BRT project provides an opportunity for the BMA to propose the 
second best congestion charge for the BRT lane while allowing free access to vehicles in the 
remaining lanes. The second best congestion charge has been shown to improve social welfare 
compared to the original BRT project. The vehicle users are now given an option to enter the 
BRT lane. Even in the extreme case where no vehicle users choose to pay the congestion charge, 
they are no worse off than before. This option increases the chance of public acceptance for the 
congestion charge when compared to the original BRT project. After the second best congestion 
charge is implemented for a given interval, the BMA can evaluate its impact on traffic and public 
acceptance. The next step is to use the evaluation results to consider the possibility of 
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